New Evidence Using Relative Measure of Religious Cleavages

    The recent investigations of the first author, in collaboration with Clem Brooks, explicitly sought to reconsiderthese five issues, as well as to develop some overall estimates of the chaging impact of religious groups on U.A party coalitions ( Manza and brooks 1997,1999,2001). We briefly summarize tjis line of reaserch here. There advances over earlier research on religion and political defined the methodological contributions of our research. First, analysesw of the relationship between social groups and political behaviour that fall to employ statistical models that allow for distinctions between trends influencing all groups from those influencing all group from those influencing only some groups neglect important information. Second, research on the social group foundations of political behaviour should include analyses of (a) group size and (b) group turnout, alongside group voting patterns. The size of group and their turnout rates will shape the impact of group-based alignments on major party electoral coalitions. a curcial way in which the interaction between religious groups ( who seek influence) and political parties ( who seek votes) takes place ( see Manza and Brooks [ 1997: chapter 7] for further discussion ). Finally, research on religious cleavages and political behavit in the United States should employ adequate measures of the the cleavage itself. Although considerably less common than twenty years ago, some analysts of religion and politics have prrsistend in falling to take into account the divisions among Protestants as well as between Protestants. Catholics, jews, and other.

        Employing models embodying these principles, our investigations of the changing contours of religion ans political behaviour im the United States suggested a number of conclusions, some of which are consistent with the thrust of previous findings, and other that challenge the conventional wisdom:

• The religious cleavage as a whole has declined very modestly since 1960. The decline is due solely to the shift toward the center of on group - liberal protestant - and this does not reflect any societal-wide trend toward dealignment.
• Liberal Protestants have moved from being the most Republicans religious group in the 1960s, to an essentii centrist position by the 1990s. This transformation has overwhelmingly been driven by their increased liberalism on social issues.
• Conservative Protestants have not realigned toward the Republican party, in large measure because they have always been Republican partisans in period ( since 1960) for which we have adequate measures. Much of tje confusion about the political preferences of comservay protestant reflects a one time shifts toward the Democratic party in 1976 ( and to lesser extent in 1980) in response to the candidacy of the born again Christian, Jimmy Carter.
• Catholic voters have not undergone any significant realignment since the 1950s. The elevated levels od Democratic voting in 1960 and 1964 are not to be found in the 1950s and should properlybe understood as reflecting tthe unusual political context of those elections. While analysts of Catholic dealignment were right to suggest that catholic were becoming more economically conservative, their Republican shift on economic questions has essentially been offset by increasingly moderate views on social issues.
• significant changes in the impact of the religious cleavage on the Democratic and Republican parties has occurred. becauseof their shrinking size and decreasing loyalty to the Republican party, mainline protestant have provided a drastically reduced share of Republican votes in recent elections ( declining from 30 percent of all Republican voters in 1960 to just 12 percent in 1992). Conservative Protestants have increased their share of votes within the Republican party primarily because of the reduction in votes from mainline sources, not because of changing partisanship or increased overall size in the electorate. Voters without any religious preference have grown in both parties from very low percentages to about 7 percent of Republican voters and 14 percent of Democratic voters.

To be sure, these findings hardly settle these issues, and debates can be expected to continue in the future ( of particular controversy are finding about the lack of a clear shift among conservative protestant: see, e.g., kohut et al. 2000; we respond to these and other challenges in Brooks and Manza 2002). furthermore, our investigations - along with those of most other analysts of religion and politics - have primarily focused on presidential elections; it may be that congressional elections, or in state and local elections, the impact or religious identities on political behaviour will have different effects ( cf. Layman 2001). These questions deserve further attention. And of course, future change in the religious marketplace ( a perpetual feature of U.S. religion) and the issue of ideological controversies dividing large religious group ensure a dynamic environment in which new analyses of old questions will be called for.

Literature citied

Ahmad Abrori, M. Si, Sosiologi Agama 2.